Fallacies that Inhibit Sound Exegesis

By Mark W. Christy, PhD

When it comes to understanding and applying the Bible, sound thinking is absolutely critical, but such thinking can become quickly obscured by many exegetical fallacies including word-study, grammatical, logical, and presuppositional and historical fallacies. In this article, an overview of the fallacies within each of these categories will be examined.

The first group, word-study fallacies, incorporates a host of fallacies which are commonly committed by interpreters and expositors. Among others, these include the root fallacy, selective and prejudicial use of evidence, and assigning words’ meanings from the wrong time period. To begin with, the commission of the root fallacy begins when the translator fails to look beyond the word itself and consider the larger context. Words do not simply contain the fullest of their meaning in and of themselves; rather, they depend on the context in which they are employed. A common example of this error is when people draw too much distinction between agape and phileo love based simply on the appearance of the word itself.

Another frequent word-study fallacy which probably everyone has committed at one time or another involves the selective and prejudicial use of evidence. For interpreters, they may be inclined to only consider evidence which supports their preference for a word’s meaning. This fallacious method of ascertaining and limiting a word’s semantic range is similar to what many theologians do when they write books in support of their interpretation. In these works, these authors will posit their view often times from a text which on the surface seems to have little to say about their particular view.

A final word study fallacy (to be mentioned in this brief summation) is the tendency to read meanings into words when that meaning comes from a different time period. To make this more apparent, one must understand that language is always evolving, and over time the meanings of words can be altered (sometimes in drastic ways). Therefore, it is crucial that scholars carefully consider the meaning of a word in the period in which it was written by the biblical authors.

The second category of exegetical fallacies involves grammatical errors. While these errors can, of course, appear in many scholarly publications, they can also find themselves in sermons by those unwitting proclaimers who fail to discern their dubious nature. Perhaps even more susceptible to these fallacies are those pastors who prefer to rely more heavily on their own knowledge of Greek to interpret the text when their knowledge of the Greek language, its many intricacies, and the many pitfalls in rendering a proper English translation may prove insufficient. Given the technical nature of these fallacies, this article will avoid any in-depth discussion on their particulars. Nevertheless, one can find an excellent discussion of these fallacies in D. A. Carson’s Exegetical Fallacies.

The third category of fallacies includes critical thinking fallacies which involve the failure to employ sound logic and the misuse of evidence to support one’s conclusions. Although many errors fall into this grouping, the one to be considered presently are those that make select appeals to evidence and the reading of one’s own experience and beliefs into the text.

The fallacy which incorporates a selective appeal to evidence by an author more focused on delivering his/her presuppositions than offering sound arguments is unfortunately all to common. One recent publication that the author of this article has had the misfortune to purchase has this fallacy on full display in almost every chapter. In this publication, Robert N. Wilkin argues the Calvinistic claim that regeneration precedes faith based on John 6: 35 which states, “I am the bread of life; he who comes to Me will not hunger, and he who believes in Me will never thirst.”  For Wilkin, this verse shows that regeneration occurs after a faith decision and not before.  While his argumentation could be provided at this time, it is better for the present purposes to allow the reader of the article to struggle to ascertain how this one verse can undo Calvinism while at the same time offer sound support for Wilkin’s theological stance. Should one look to Wilkin for guidance by going to his book directly, one will find him all too willing to infuse his argument into this text so as to deliver the gullible over to his position.

A second critical thinking fallacy is sometimes called world-view confusion. Those who commit this error fail to perform their due diligence in regard to sound exegesis of Scripture and instead read their preferred understanding onto the text. This faulty understanding may arise from their experiences, their current beliefs, their current thoughts and understanding, and a myriad of other sources that all exist outside of the text itself. This fallacy is currently on full display in many (if not most) of America’s churches where self-help and prosperity messages are preached irrespective of the original intent of the biblical authors.

A third critical thinking fallacy substitutes emotion for reasoning altogether. The commission of this error can be found in Joyce Meyer’s Battlefield of the Mind. In this work, Meyer seeks to compel her readers to employ Christian mysticism by seeking God’s revelation directly through prayers and employing the Bible as little more than a collection of magical mantras to empower one’s life.[i] Despite her clear warning to believers about allowing themselves to be emotionally ruled, her employment of a mystical hermeneutic can only lead to a substitution of emotions for critical reasoning.[ii]

Another common thinking error involves unwarranted generalization and overspecification. This problem occurs when a biblical interpreter takes a text that offers a generalized discussion (sometimes in the form of a narrative) and draws particular propositional truth claims that go beyond the original intent of the author behind the text. For example, Leighton Flowers, in his defense of Arminianism, suggests Jesus’s Parable of the Wedding Feast as a potential text to bring “clarity to the complex issue of divine election” in regard to his opposing view of Calvinism.  Despite this being a parable or story, Flowers essentially argues that its loose wording, common to stories, offers sound support of his view of libertarian free will. While, of course, he is not wrong for making use of the text if he indeed believes it supports his argument, he would do far better to start with objective, propositional truth statements that would lend hard evidence to support his views.

The final major category of fallacies comprises those which involve presuppositional and historical errors. These errors are readily committed due to the bias of the interpreter or sometimes due to the willful prejudice against what would otherwise be the clear meaning of the text. Regardless, it is quite easy to force one’s own theology into the text; likewise, it is also easy to avoid an uncomfortable interpretation that fails to suit one’s prejudices. To avoid making these errors, one must consider the text itself and the time period of the text in relation to the biblical storyline before considering the larger theological framework offered by the Bible as a whole. In conclusion, biblical interpretation requires a willingness to seek the truth revealed in Scripture irrespective of one’s bias. To accomplish this, interpreters must set aside their emotions, their experiences, and even their beliefs so as to approach the text to understand the clear intent of the original author. As they do, they must avoid the many fallacies that inhibit sound exegesis.

[i]See “Turning Self Up and the Word Down: Joyce Meyer’s Approach to the Battlefield of the Mind,” available at: https://battlehardenedbeliever.com/?p=1851 and “The Problem of Christian Mysticism: An Engagement with Joyce Meyer,” available at: https://battlehardenedbeliever.com/?p=1869.

[ii]Joyce Meyer, Battlefield of the Mind: Winning the Battle in Your Mind (Tulsa, OK: Harrison, 1995), 149.